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Abstract 
Why have governments systematically taken positions that are out of synch with what voters want in negotiations 
on transferring national sovereignty to the EU? Despite the centrality of this question there is little research that 
has focused explicitly on explaining why governments take positions that are out of synch with their voters. Most 
existing studies of voter preferences towards European integration have focused either upon the sources of voter 
preferences or upon party views towards integration. In comparison, there have been almost no studies that have 
investigated the ‘electoral connection’; in other words the process whereby voter preferences are translated into 
actual national positions in EU constitutional negotiations. Using data drawn from the 1996-97 negotiation of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, this paper attempts to explain why voter preferences are often not reflected in national 
positions. It is found that the level of ‘disproportionality’ of the electoral system has an impact upon the level of 
divergence between national positions and voter views.  
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EARLY DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 1. Introduction 
 
The failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums in 2005 clearly showed that 
governments out of synch with what voters want in negotiations on transferring national sovereignty to 
the EU. Why do we see such a lack of correspondence in what is termed the ‘electoral connection’ 
between voter preferences towards European integration and the positions that governments take in 
negotiations on further integrative steps? In a perfect representative democracy, there is a democratic 
chain of delegation that links voters with their elected representatives and then onwards to the 
executive branch and finally to civil servants in the bureaucracy (Strøm 2000). In this ‘perfect world’ 
scenario we would expect voter views to map perfectly onto the actual positions taken by governments. 
But is this an accurate picture? 
  The last three decades have seen the European Union (EU) transformed from a dormant free 
trade zone into a quasi-federal conglomerate focused on market integration through a series of EU 
constitutional negotiations (Intergovernmental Conferences). Governments have transferred national 
sovereignty to the EU-level in an increasingly wide range of areas of public policy; with the most far-
reaching transfer being the creation of a common currency, the euro. While integration theorists long 
held that integration was an elite-driven process, and that disinterested voters accepted it due to a 
‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), this argument became increasingly untenable 
after the repeated public rejection of integrative steps forward in referendum in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Further, given the high political stakes involved in questions relating to the transferral of national 
sovereignty to the EU level, we should expect that voters are vigilant and hold their representatives 
accountable, and that politicians would therefore respond to public demands for more/less integration. 
  This paper investigates the degree to which governments are out of touch with voter 
preferences by measuring the level of correspondence between voter views and national positions, and 
then develops a set of hypotheses that can explain cross-national differences. National positions and 
not just ‘preferences’ are measured in this paper, as I am interested in measuring what governments 
actually say and do in Brussels, and not just what they say in public justifications prior to negotiations. 
The paper finds that there are large cross-national differences in how responsive governmental 
positions are to voter preferences.  
  Unfortunately, despite the large number of studies that have looked at the European integration 
process, the state-of-the-art at present is that we are more-or-less in the dark as to why there are large 
cross-national differences in how responsive governments are to voter views. There are several studies 
of voter preferences towards European integration, but these have focused either upon the sources of voter preferences (e.g. Hix 2007; Wilson 2000) or upon party views towards integration (Marks and 
Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; Taggart 1998). In comparison, there have been almost no 
studies that have investigated the electoral connection and how it impacts upon the representation (or 
lack thereof) of voter views in EU constitutional negotiations. However, to my knowledge there have 
been no studies that focus upon cross-national differences in level of government responsiveness to 
voter views on European integration.  
  This paper is therefore an exploratory study of potential explanatory factors drawn from 
theoretical debates on electoral systems and EU politics. In the theoretical section, four different 
competing theoretical hypotheses are developed that can potentially explain cross-national variation in 
the level of divergence. The four hypotheses relate to contentions that distortions can arise due to 
either factors related to the electoral system, patterns of party competition (elite consensus) or whether 
governments are more responsive when they face the prospect of a referendum. The hypotheses are 
tested upon data drawn from the negotiation in the 1996-97 of the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
  The paper finds that only the hypothesis about the distortive effects of electoral rules matters 
significantly. There is evidence that suggests that we see larger differences between voter views and 
national positions in systems such as France and the UK, where there is a large disproportion between 
the number of votes cast for a party and seats allocated. In contrast, there are lower levels of divergence 
between voter views and national positions in more proportional systems such as Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal. These findings are tentative, and more research is needed in order to 
develop better theoretical hypotheses that can be tested on a broader selection of cases than just the 
1996-97 negotiations.  
  
 2. Theory – the electoral connection in EU constitutional negotiations 
 
In the ideal-typical model of representative democracy the process whereby voter preferences are 
translated into national positions is seen as a neutral transmission belt. Given that voters are competent 
and well-informed,
1 in this ideal model we should expect to see that national positions reflect voter 
preferences in highly salient issues such as the transferral of national sovereignty to the EU. As seen in 
figure 1, the chain of parliamentary delegation starts with voters who elect representatives. 
Representatives then appoint a parliamentary government (prime minister) that controls the execution 
of policy by the bureaucracy (Strøm 2000). There are no agency costs in a perfect representative system, 
meaning that voter preferences are translated perfectly into national positions.  
 
 
Voters Æ elect Æ political representatives Æ appoint Æ executive Æ controls  Æ bureaucracy Æ formulates national positions 
 
 
Figure 1 – The chain of delegation in representative parliamentary democracies. 
 
  Reality is of course slightly different, and there are many potential distorting factors in the chain 
of accountability linking voters with policy outputs (national positions). The best illustration of the fact 
that national positions do not always represent voter preferences was seen in the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005 by Dutch and French voters. During the negotiation of the 
Constitutional Treaty, both governments supported relatively pro-integration positions; positions that 
were then rejected by their voters when they were asked to endorse the Constitutional Treaty in 
national referenda.
2  
                                                 
1 - Voter competences as regards foreign policy issues have been hotly debated since Almond denigrating analyses of voter 
competences in the 1950s (Almost 1950). The scholarly consensus today is that while voters are perhaps as ‘ignorant’ and 
unconcerned about most foreign policy issues, in major questions such as war, or in this article the permanent transferral of 
national sovereignty to the EU, voters are generally viewed as competent (Aldrich et al 2006; Sobel 2001). There is some 
debate on whether voters preferences influence elite views or vice versa (see e.g. Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). 
In other words, elites cue voters, meaning that the causal arrows are reversed in figure 1. As regards this study, the large 
differences across countries in the degree of divergence between voter views and national positions suggest that voters are not 
merely following elite cues.  
2 - It can be argued that voters in referendums are not up to the task of determining whether a treaty reflects their 
preferences, and therefore treat them as ‘second-order’ elections that can be used to express discontent with unpopular 
governments (Franklin et al 1994; Garry, Marsh and Sinnott 2005; Ivaldi 2006). However, most of the recent scholarly 
evidence suggests that voters actually do vote upon the issue put before them, and therefore we can use a ‘no’ vote in a   Despite the centrality of this question there is little research that has focused explicitly on 
explaining why governments take positions that are out of synch with their voters; in other words why 
the electoral connection does not always function. Most existing studies of voter preferences towards 
European integration have focused either upon the sources of voter preferences (e.g. Hix 2007; Wilson 
2000) or upon party views towards integration (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; 
Taggart 1998). In comparison, there have been almost no studies that have investigated the electoral 
connection and how it impacts upon the lack of representation of voter views in EU constitutional 
negotiations. Aspinwall (2002) finds, using measures that are similar to the ones employed here, that 
there is ‘…no relationship whatsoever between public opinion and governmental preferences’ (p. 103), 
but he does not investigate whether there are cross-national variations in the level of divergence 
between voter views and national positions. When this is done, it becomes clear that some countries are 
better than others at representing the views of voters in EU constitutional negotiations. In other words, 
despite the title of his article, Aspinwall does not investigate how variations in the ‘electoral connection’ 
actually impact upon whether governments do what voters want in EU negotiations.  
  Before I proceed it should also be noted that this study focuses explicitly upon national positions, 
or in other words what positions governments actually take in EU constitutional negotiations. Most 
existing studies have focused upon national preferences, measured using vague pronouncements by 
governments that are intended for public consumption. However, as will be discussed further below, 
governments often say one thing in public and do another behind closed doors. What I am interested 
in explaining in this paper is the differences in what voters want and what governments actually do in 
EU constitutional negotiations, and therefore I utilize national positions as the ultimate ‘output’ of the 
political system.  
  The level of divergence between voter views and national positions is treated as the dependent 
variable in this study, with factors that potentially can explain cross-national variations in the level of 
divergence treated as the independent variables. In terms of the chain of delegation as depicted in 
figure 1, I am interested in testing whether factors related to different electoral systems and the extent 
to which they distort the transferral of voter demands into the political system, and whether factors 
such as the presence of an elite consensus amongst political representatives affects the degree to which 
voter preferences are reflected in national positions.
3 For example, are voters in proportional 
                                                                                                                                                                  
referendum as a litmus test for the degree to which voter views corresponded to national positions (see Beach and Nielsen 
forthcoming; Hobolt 2009).  
3 - One potential problem here is that there might be reverse causality, with voter views being in effect created by elite 
views. However, both Carrubba (2001) and Ray (2003) find evidence suggesting that voter preferences shape elite positions, 
and not the other way around. representative electoral systems better able to influence national positions than those in majoritarian 
systems?  
  These factors are related to the shaded area in figure 1, and will be investigated by drawing 
upon existing theories of the impact of electoral systems and party competition. Not depicted in this 
figure is the direct democratic channel of public referendums on the ratification of a treaty. As this 
potentially can be a means to control national positions by voters (Christin and Hug 2002), this factor is 
also investigated in the paper. 
 
The impact of the electoral system 
There are two stages in the electoral process relating to electoral laws and regulations that can 
potentially distort the input of voter preferences into the political system. First, factors relating to media 
access and campaign finance can potentially have a distorting effect (Norris 2005:83-104). In the 
following I have chosen to focus upon the potential disruptive effect of public party funding and 
campaign media access. We should expect that when there is equitable access to public funds and the 
media that these more egalitarian provisions will benefit smaller, issue-based parties that articulate voter 
demands on issues such as more/less integration. For instance the Unity List (Enhedslisten) in 
Denmark is an issue-based party that focuses upon two issues: anti-capitalism and anti-EU. Without 
access to public funds and free public media time, the party would arguably be unable to achieve 
representation, which would further reduce the already scant representation of anti-EU views in the 
Danish parliament.  
 
 
H1 – The more disruptive the regulations relating to media and funding access, the higher the level of 
divergence between voter views and national positions 
 
 
  The second stage of the electoral process is related to the regulation of elections, and in 
particular the degree of ‘disproportionality’ between votes cast and seats allocated in parliament 
(Gallagher 2005). In proportional electoral systems with low thresholds such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands, there is an almost perfect correspondence between votes cast and seats allocated. In this 
type of system, minor parties can mobilize niche cleavages such as Eurosceptic views, as there is the realistic possibility that they can achieve representation (Norris 2005: 106-109).
4 In contrast, in 
majoritarian systems there is a large difference between the number of votes cast and seats allocated. In 
majoritarian systems it is more difficult for minor parties to gain representation (termed the ‘mechanical 
effect’ by Duverger), but voters are also less prone to vote for minor parties as they perceive that their 
votes would be wasted (the ‘psychological effect’). Both effects create pressures that result in fewer 
parties, and create incentives for parties to represent the views of the median voter, resulting in a 
system where the full spectrum of voter demands are not articulated through the electoral system, at 
least in theory. Therefore, we should expect that there is a higher level of divergence in countries that 
have electoral regulations that create a high level of ‘disproportionality’ between the numbers of votes 
cast and seat allocated.  
 
 
H2 – The higher the level of disproportionality of the electoral system, the higher the level of 
divergence between voter views and national positions 
 
 
Elite consensus    
Turning from factors related to the electoral system to how party competition (or lack thereof) can 
potentially impact upon the level of divergence, I will focus upon what I believe to be the most 
promising hypothesis drawn from the theoretical debate on public opinion and European integration; 
the degree of elite consensus. The basic argument here is that when there is a strong elite consensus on 
EU integration-related issues, elites will have few incentives to raise the EU issue in national elections 
(Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007; Ray 2003; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). In this situation, 
‘If voters are not offered a choice between different visions of Europe, whatever the differences 
between voters, these cannot be expressed in their choices of parties to support.’ (van der Eijk and 
Franklin 2004:39). Although there are other potential channels for voters to articulate their views (e.g. 
lobbying), the primary mechanism whereby voter demands are translated into governmental policies is 
in the election of parties to parliament (Ibid). De Vries (2007) for example finds evidence that EU 
issues play a role in national elections when there is higher level of conflict between parties on the issue. 
                                                 
4 - Note that this contrasts with the arguments presented by Aspinwall (2002:106), who argues that first-past-the-post 
majoritarian systems will often have large catch-all parties that can include Euroskeptics in the governing party – and 
therefore majoritarian systems are more likely to see anti-EU views represented than in proportional representation. We should therefore expect that as the level of elite consensus on EU issues increases, that there is a 
strong potential that the level of divergence should also increase.  
  
 
H3 – The higher the level of elite consensus within the party system on EU issues, the higher the level 
of divergence between voter views and national positions 
 
 
The impact of direct democracy 
The final hypothesis that will be investigated is whether holding referendums matters. Christin and Hug 
(2002) and Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries (2007) argue that referendums can be a powerful 
mechanism for creating a ‘bottom-up’ linkage between voters and political parties. In the words of 
Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries, ‘Since it is potentially costly for party elites to embark on policies 
only to find them repudiated in a referendum, the referendum mechanism provides strong incentives 
for political parties to align their policy stances with the positions of their constituents (2007, p. 19). If 
party elites align their views with voter preferences, we should expect that these demands should be 
transmitted further through the political system, resulting in national positions that more closely reflect 
voter views.  
  In connection with a specific round of EU constitutional negotiations, it is further argued by 
Christin and Hug that the mechanism is strongest when a referendum is binding and required and elites 
are cognizant of this prior to the start of the negotiations. In the case of the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam investigated in this paper, Ireland had to hold a binding referendum, whereas a binding 
referendum was highly likely in Denmark.
5 
 
 
H4 – Levels of divergence should be lower in countries that are required to hold a referendum 
 
                                                 
5 - A binding referendum had to be held if the Treaty resulted in the transferral of sovereignty and the Treaty was unable to 
be ratified by a 5/6th majority in the parliament. As it was expected that the yes-side would be unable to secure a 5/6 th 
majority, a referendum was expected by elites prior to the negotiations (Laursen 2002).  3. Research design 
 
This study utilizes the case of the Treaty of Amsterdam negotiations in 1996-97 in order to test whether 
any of the four hypotheses can explain differing levels of divergence between voter views and national 
positions. More recent rounds of EU constitutional reform such as the negotiation of the 
Constitutional Treaty have dealt primarily with questions relating to institutional design, and therefore 
did not deal as directly with the transferral of national sovereignty to the EU level (the more-less 
integration cleavage). For example, the issue of extending the powers of the European Parliament does 
not map directly onto the more-less integration cleavage, as one can want a stronger supranational 
Europe but prefer to strengthen the Commission and/or Council of Ministers instead. In contrast, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam negotiations in 1996-97 dealt with a range of questions directly relating to 
whether further competences should be transferred to the EU-level. Fourteen countries are 
investigated, with Luxembourg being excluded due to the lack of information on several variables. 
  To test the explanatory power of the four competing hypotheses requires valid measures of 
voter views, national positions, and the four explanatory hypotheses. Voter views are measured using 
Eurobarometer data that was collected half-way through the negotiations (October-November 1996) 
(Eurobarometer 1997) on the transferral of sovereignty in six issues that closely match the range of 
debate in the negotiations (defense, foreign policy, environment, unemployment, immigration, and 
asylum). 
  Existing research on the electoral connection in EU politics usually utilize a single question, 
where respondents are asked whether the EU is a ‘good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’ (e.g. Carrubba 2001). 
Unfortunately, this is not always a very valid measure of voter views towards further transfers of 
sovereignty, as a respondent can believe that the EU is a ‘good thing’ while at the same time not 
wanting any more of the ‘good thing’. That this question conflates the more-less integration cleavage 
with another cleavage on the benefits of integration can be clearly seen in the Eurobarometer 
responses. Belgian respondents have a net positive response of 30%, whereas for Greeks it is 46% 
(Eurobarometer 1997, question 2.1). This suggests that Belgians want ‘less’ integration than Greek 
voters, but the opposite is the case when we actually measure whether voters want more or less 
integration. This is measured using a composite of questions that ask whether decision-making should 
be at the national or EU-level on six different issues (question 3.11). Translated into a scale from 0 to 
10, where a 10 is full support for transfer to the EU-level in all six areas and 0 is full opposition, the 
mean value for Belgian respondents is 7.5 whereas Greek respondents are much more reticent about 
more integration (mean value of 5.5) (for the full data set see table 1 in the appendix).    In order to measure validly national positions I do not utilize public pronouncements, as there is 
often a large discrepancy between the positions that national governments actually take during the 
negotiations and pronouncements outside of the negotiating room that are intended for public 
consumption. Most existing studies have however utilized public pronouncements (e.g. Aspinwall 2002; 
Koenig-Archibugi 2004), but this does not measure what positions governments took behind closed 
doors. As it is these positions upon which the negotiations are based and that produce the final 
outcome, it is therefore vital that we measure what positions governments actually took during the 
negotiations.
6  
  There are two ways in which this can be achieved. The best method would be to utilize archival 
sources such as inside documents describing what governments said behind closed doors. The archival 
sources would include summary descriptions of national positions compiled by different foreign 
ministries, along with records of what delegates actually said during meetings. However, while I possess 
this type of material, it is still classified, and therefore the second best solution to measuring national 
positions is by interviewing participants. 
  The next best solution is to utilize participant interviews. A team led by Thurner, Pappi and 
Stoiber collected information on national positions across the range of issues negotiated in the 1996-97 
IGC using participant interviews from all fourteen member states (Thurner, Pappi and Stoiber 2002). 
In order to measure national positions on the six issues, I have utilized as many questions as possible 
from their study that measure the dimension less-more integration in each of the six issues. For 
example, for measuring national positions on foreign policy I compiled an index based on four 
questions: whether foreign policy actions should be financed over the Community budget, the degree 
to which implementation of foreign policies should be strengthened at the EU level, whether to 
introduce more majority voting, and introduce common planning of foreign policy (questions 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, 2.4) (see appendix 1 for the full data set). All of the questions were first transformed onto a 0 to 10 
scale of less-more integration, and then added together without weighting. For the aggregate data, see 
appendix 1. In order to validate the measures, I have cross-checked this data with an alternative coding 
based upon confidential archival sources, supplemented with national proposals tabled during the 
negotiations. A relatively high level of correlation between the two measures (0.72) was found.  
 The  level of divergence between voter views and national positions is measured by subtracting the 
scores of national positions and voter views. As divergence can mean both voter supporting more 
                                                 
6 - One problem with positions is that they also can reflect strategic concerns, with some governments choosing more 
pragmatic positions whereas others adopt maximalist positions that will never be adopted, but that are used strategically to 
nudge other governments in a specific direction. However, while this raises problems, these same problems also exist when 
using public pronouncements.   integration than the government and the opposite, the overall level of divergence was calculated by 
using absolute totals of sums of each score subtracted from each other. The aggregate levels of 
divergence are reproduced in table 1 below, and the full data is in appendix 1.  
 
Table 1 – aggregate figures of the dependent and independent variables 
  
Level of divergence 
Distortions in media
and public finance 
Level of 
disproportionality 
(rescaled) 
Elite 
consensus 
(rescaled) 
Referendum
AUS 2.42  2.5  0  1.13 0 
B 1.75  7.5  0.83  10  0 
DK 3.33  3.8  0.23 8.52  7.5 
F 3.75  7.5  10  9.47  0 
FIN 2.5  2.5  1.15 6.19  0 
GER 3.08  6.3  0.49  8.20 0 
GR 2.97    3.48  0 0 
I 1.72  10  2.43  7.60  0 
IRL 2.03  5  0.85 8.07  10 
NL 1.45  5  0.02 8.59  0 
PORT 1.67  8.8  1.47  3.11  0 
S 2.82  3.8  0.06  7.67  0 
SP 4.45  10  1.79  5.68  0 
UK 4.02  7.5  5.17 5.01  0 
Sources: See appendix 1 for the sources of the level of divergence; distortions in media and public 
finance (IDEA 2004); level of disproportionality (Gallagher 2005; Elite convergence (Ray 1999); 
referendums (Laursen 2002; Christin and Hug 2002).  
 
  Distortions in access to the media and public finance were measured utilizing an eight point index 
developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2004). IDEA’s study 
lists eight different aspects of the access to public finance and the media that potentially can distort the 
articulation of voter demands (2004), and has been used by scholars such as Norris (2005). These 
figures were then transposed onto a relative ten point scale with a value of 0 being the most egalitarian 
system amongst the fourteen countries, whereas as a value of 10 was given to the country (Greece) that 
scored the highest on the eight items (see table 1).   The  level of disproportionality, or what can be referred to as the level of distortion of electoral rules 
between vote share and seat share, is measured utilizing Gallagher’s index, which is the most widely 
utilized measure in electoral systems research (Gallagher 2005). The index is calculated by taking a least 
squares index of the disparity between the number of seats and the number of votes of parties in the 
most recent election prior to the start of the negotiations (see Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, appendix 
B). I have re-scaled the index scores onto a 0-10 scale, with 10 being the most disproportional in the 
most recent election.  
  In order to measure levels of elite consensus I have drawn upon the data collected by Ray in an 
expert survey on the positions of political parties on European integration (less-more dimension) (Ray 
1999). The measure is then constructed by using the position of the largest three parties in terms of 
number of seats in the most recent elections, and measuring the distance between the two scores that 
are farthest apart. Substantively it can be argued that using three parties effectively measures patterns of 
coalition government in Europe, where the pattern is often alternation of power between two large 
parties with a third smaller party joining the government. Further, the measures utilizing both four and 
five parties were not significantly different, and therefore for substantive reasons I have chosen to only 
use three parties. These figures were then rescaled to a relative 10 point scale with a score of ten being 
the highest level of elite consensus (smallest distance amongst the three parties), and a 0 given to the 
least amount of elite consensus found.  
  Finally, the scores for referendums are based upon information from Laursen (2002) and Christin 
and Hug (2002). Ireland had to hold a binding referendum irrespective of the outcome, whereas it was 
very probable that Denmark would have to hold a referendum. Denmark was given a score of 7.5, as 
there was an off chance that either a) no sovereignty was transferred in the negotiations, or b) if 
sovereignty was transferred a 5/6
th majority could be mustered in parliament, a referendum would not 
have been legally necessary).  
  4. Analysis  
 
Table 2 presents the statistical results of a linear regression of the full data set. The only explanatory 
variable that is significantly related to the dependent variable is the level of disproportionality. 
However, statistical significance is not the same as substantive importance. When we look at the full 
data set there does not appear to be any strong substantive effects of any of the explanatory variables. 
As can be seen, the model performs very poorly (R
2 = 0.062).   
  
Table 2 – Explaining the divergence between voter views and national positions 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error 
Media and funding access  -0.015  .138 
Level of disproportionality  0.175**  .067 
Elite consensus  -.0541    .094 
Referendum 0.018  .070 
R-squared 0.0631   
N 78   
Note: Linear regression with robust clustering by country run using Stata 10. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, *p < .1 (two-tailed) 
  
  The analysis is more interesting when we utilize aggregate, country-level information. The 
following figures were all created using data drawn from table 1. First, there does not appear to be any 
significant relationship between either media/funding access, elite consensus or referendums based 
upon the figures 1-3 illustrated below, echoing the findings of the statistical analysis of the full data set 
shown in table 2. In figure 1 we see that in the two most egalitarian systems there is a relatively low 
level of divergence, which is what we expected based upon H1. But in countries where there are more 
cartel-like arrangements (Italy, Portugal, Spain), we see that there is no relationship between the two 
variables. Italy has the lowest level of divergence, whereas Spain has the highest.  
 Figure 1 – Levels of divergence and media and funding access 
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  The picture is even more confused when we investigate H3 (elite consensus) (figure 2). We 
should expect to see that where there is a low degree of elite consensus in a party system that parties 
would have incentives to mobilize the EU issue in national elections, bringing elite views in line with 
voter views (lower level of divergence).  
 
 
Figure 2 – Levels of divergence and elite consensus of views 
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  Greece was the country where there was the lowest level of elite consensus, where the 
Communist Party of Greece had strongly anti-EU views in comparison to the two large parties (PASOK and New Democracy) that were more pro-EU. However this lack of elite consensus did not 
translate into a lower level of divergence.  
  At the opposite end of the spectrum, there was a strong elite consensus in Belgium, but here 
voters were closely in line with elite preferences. One interpretation of the Belgian figures can be that 
there are structural conditions (such as the disfunctionality of the Belgian political system) that make 
both elites and voters very pro-EU in Belgium, thereby suppressing any other effects.  
  The Danish case is more in line with what we would expect. Here we see that there was a 
significant degree of elite consensus on the EU (8.5), suggesting that what we should also expect that 
the main Danish parties did not have incentives to raise the EU issue in parliamentary elections, 
resulting in a large divergence between voter views and national positions. This is substantiated in the 
Danish case. For example, while the Social Democratic party leadership has been pro-EU since the late 
1980s, their voters have been significantly more anti-EU, resulting in strong party interests in holding 
EU issues outside of parliamentary elections and instead relegating the EU issue to referendum 
campaigns and EP elections.  
  A more nuanced explanation is necessary when we investigate the direction of divergence; in 
some issues the Danish government was more pro-EU than voters (employment and the environment), 
whereas in both defense and foreign policy voters held more pro-EU views than the positions taken by 
the government. This suggests that the lack of debate on the EU issue in national elections results in 
Danish politicians being simply more out of touch with voter demands, and not just that elites are 
systematically more pro-EU than Danish voters. 
   
Figure 3 – Levels of divergence and referendums 
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   Unfortunately, at least for analytical purposes, referendums were rare phenomena before the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. For the 1996-97 negotiations, Ireland was the only 
country where it was certain before hand that they would hold a referendum (score = 10), whereas it 
was expected before-hand that it was highly likely that Denmark would also hold one (score = 7.5). 
Ireland’s placement in figure 3 is what we would expect following H4, suggesting that holding a 
referendum might force the government to negotiate positions that it knows would be accepted by 
voters (low level of divergence). However, this leaves the high level of divergence in the Danish case 
unexplained. 
  As with the statistical results from the full data set, the only explanatory factor that is linked 
with varying levels of divergence is the level of disproportionality of the electoral system in the 
aggregate country-level results. Hypothesis 2 suggested that the stronger the distortion between vote 
share and seat share due to the electoral system, the higher the level of divergence. Figure 4 shows that 
there is a quite strong relationship at the aggregate country level.  
 
Figure 4 – Levels of divergence and the disproportionality of electoral systems 
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  Here we see that majoritarian systems such as Britain and France, where there is a large 
discrepancy between votes and seats, also display high levels of divergence between voter views and 
national positions. However, in both countries voter views were measured as being more pro-EU than 
the positions that their governments eventually adopted. This suggests two possible explanations. First, 
if the measures are valid, then this suggests that majoritarian systems have the potential of producing 
governments with more extreme pro/anti EU views than is possible in more proportional systems. In France the Chirac administration adopted positions inspired by its Gaullist ideology (Deloche-Gaudez 
2002), whereas in the UK the Conservative government was increasingly dependent upon Euroskeptic 
backbenchers in 1996, resulting in strong anti-European positions being adopted that arguably did not 
represent a majority of voter preferences (Best 2002).   
  An alternative explanation could be that the measures are invalid, especially in the UK case. The 
Eurobarometer question on views towards different issues in the British case results in a relatively pro-
EU score. Similar pro-EU scores in the British case are also reached if we utilize other Eurobarometer 
questions such as is ‘EU a good thing’ or a more precise question on the desired speed of European 
unification (question 1.12). One explanation of this unexpectedly high level of British voter support for 
the EU could be that the Eurobarometer answer categories systematically skew British voters towards 
middle categories (as consensus-minded British voters dislike being perceived as being ‘extreme’), but 
relative to other countries British mainstream views towards the EU are arguably quite extreme. Therefore 
there is the significant possibility that highly skeptical British views are underrepresented in the 
Eurobarometer data. 
  If we ignore potential data problems the pattern is however quite close to what we would 
expect based upon hypothesis 2. Countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, where minor issue-based 
parties are able to achieve representation relatively easily, also have relatively low levels of divergence 
between national positions and voter views. Majoritarian systems are able to create larger oscillations in 
the composition of preferences represented in government. The result in the case investigated in this 
paper was that both the British and French governments negotiated positions that were more anti-EU 
than what a majority of their voters wanted. This finding is exactly the opposite of the arguments 
presented by Aspinwall (2002:106). He argues that first-past-the-post majoritarian systems will often 
have large catch-all parties that can include Euroskeptics in the governing party – and therefore 
majoritarian systems are more likely to see anti-EU views represented than in proportional 
representation. The findings of this paper suggest that the opposite is the case.  
  If we look at figure 4 we see that Spain is an outlier. In the Spanish case, with the exception of 
the environmental issue, the government adopted significantly more pro-EU positions than voters 
preferred. Again one can question the Eurobarometer measures, and if we compare the relatively 
skeptical scores on the specific issues with general Spanish attitudes towards the EU, it does appear that 
the data in appendix 1 underestimates the positive views of Spaniards towards the EU (the net EU 
good/bad thing is +30% for Belgium and +40% for Spain, Eurobarometer question 2.1, 1997). One 
interpretation of this discrepancy between measures could be that the EU is not a salient issue for 
Spanish voters, and therefore while they might be strongly pro-EU, they have difficulties being consistent when they are asked for views on specific issues. However, the scores do reflect the 
alternative measure ‘desired speed of integration’ (question 2.8, Eurobarometer 1997), suggesting that 
the chosen measure is valid in comparison to the cruder EU ‘good/bad’ thing question, and therefore 
that the unexpectedly high level of divergence in the Spanish case is an anomaly that needs to be 
explained in further research.    
  Concluding, the analysis found that of the four competing explanatory variables only the level 
of disproportionality of the electoral system was significantly correlated with divergence between 
national positions and voter views. Are there any other potential alternative explanatory factors that 
potentially could explain variation in the degree to which governments do what voters want in EU 
issues? One possible factor is whether there is a strong parliamentary control of governments in EU 
issues, with the argument being that in systems with strong control we should expect that voter views 
are better translated into national positions, other things equal. However, in the three countries with the 
strongest parliamentary control of national positions in the EU (Denmark, Sweden and the UK), all 
three were at the high end of levels of divergence, suggesting counter-intuitively that governments are 
more in line with voter views when they are under less control by national parliaments. Another potential 
factor that could be investigated is whether the party composition of governments matter. Do center-
left governments better reflect voter preferences on Europe than center-right governments? Here again 
there does not seem to be any explanatory traction, as there were center-left governments in low 
divergence countries like the Netherlands and Portugal and high divergence countries like Denmark. 
Finally, it does appear that pro-EU countries such as Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal 
have lower levels of divergence than more skeptical countries (Denmark, UK). This suggests that there 
might be an underlying structural variable in these countries that pushes both voter views and national 
positions in a pro-EU direction. As we see net beneficiaries of the EU budget such as France and Spain 
with high levels of divergence, an alternative could be the level of dependence upon EU trade. But this 
does not explain why Denmark has such a high level of divergence. More theorization and testing of 
hypotheses is needed.  
   
    
 5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to shed light on the question of why governments travel to Brussels and 
negotiate treaties transferring sovereignty to the EU-level that are out of synch with what voters want. 
While most existing studies have only focused upon the link between voters and political parties, this 
study has extended the analysis to look at whether what governments actually do corresponds to what 
voters want.  
  Examining cross-national differences in the level of divergence between voter preferences and 
the actual positions adopted in the negotiations, it was found that national positions were more in-line 
with voter views in proportional representation systems than they are in majoritarian systems such as 
France and the UK. In majoritarian systems, minor issue-based parties face strong barriers to entry, and 
as we saw in both France and the UK, majority governments created by the disproportional electoral 
systems adopted positions that were more extreme than what a majority of voters wanted.  
  There were two significant outliers that fell outside of this general pattern; Denmark and Spain. 
In the Danish case, the electoral system produced few distortions between votes cast and seats 
allocated, but there was nonetheless a high level of divergence. One explanation for this could be the 
high level of elite consensus on EU issues; a consensus that has resulted in the relegation of the debate 
on the EU issue to referendums and EP elections. Due to the lack of debate, it was argued that Danish 
politicians were relatively out of touch with what voters actually wanted, and therefore both supported 
more integration in some areas than voters wanted, but also opposed more integration in other areas 
where voters wanted integration.  
  The Spanish case was more difficult to explain. Here we saw a combination of a relatively low 
level of distortion in the electoral system with a very high level of divergence between positions and 
voter views. The Spanish government took positions that were significantly more pro-integration than 
what voters wanted. One possible explanation for this could be that the Eurobarometer measures 
systematically underrepresented the pro-EU views of the Spanish electorate. This anomaly needs to be 
better accounted for in future studies.  
  While I argue that the measures employed in this study are an improvement upon existing 
studies, there is still a great degree of caution that must be expressed regarding their validity. I am quite 
confident in the validity of the measures of national positions, as I have validated the measures based 
upon participant interviews with archival records of what positions governments actually took behind 
closed doors. I am however much more concerned about the validity of the measures regarding voter 
views. While the measure that I utilized was a significant improvement upon the crude EU ‘good/bad’ thing proxy that is otherwise widely used, I found several instances where the patterns in the data were 
questionable based upon my knowledge of the public debate in the UK and the secondary literature. I 
am not sure that the Eurobarometer questions are especially valid when comparing countries due to 
different national contexts. What might be perceived to be an extreme view in Belgian regarding less-
more integration might arguably be perceived as mid-range in the UK. If this is true, we would need to 
incorporate some form of correction for this relativism into our cross-country measures. Given that it 
is impossible to create a new survey with more valid cross-country answer categories that measure 
events in the mid-1990s, and attempting to ‘correct’ the measures through weighting would be very 
subjective, the more realistic alternative is to flag these problems and treat the findings with a measure 
of caution.  
  This paper has unfortunately only scratched the surface as regards explaining why governments 
do not do what voters want in EU constitutional negotiations. More research is needed on other 
rounds of negotiations in order to see whether the findings hold in other cases. In the final version of 
this paper, I will also investigate the negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty. Further, more theorizing 
is needed in order to develop other potential factors that hopefully have more explanatory power. The 
data shows that governments are more in-line with voters in some countries like Belgian, Ireland and 
Portugal, but better explanations for why they are so are needed in order to understand (and perhaps 
prevent) further debacles like the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.  
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 Appendix 1 – Full list of governmental positions and voter views on the six issues. 
Country id and issue number  Governmental positions  Voter views  Level of divergence 
a1 7.5  5  2.5 
a2 5.9  8  2.1 
a3 10  5  5 
a4 8.3  5  3.3 
a5 3.8  3  0.8 
a6 3.8  3  0.8 
b1 7.5  7  0.5 
b2 8.7  9  0.3 
b3 6  9  3 
b4 6.7  6  0.7 
b5 10  7  3 
b6 10  7  3 
dk1 0  3  3 
dk2 1.7  6  4.3 
dk3 8  5  3 
dk4 6.7  2  4.7 
dk5 0  2  2 
dk6 0  3  3 
fin1 0  0  0 
fin2 5.1  6  0.9 
fin3 6  4  2 
fin4 6.7  4  2.7 
fin5 6.7  1  5.7 
fin6 6.7  3  3.7 
f1 5  5  0 
f2 5.1  9  3.9 
f3 2  8  6 
f4 0  6  6 
f5 9.3  6  3.3 
f6 9.3  6  3.3 
g1 7.5  7  0.5 
g2 7.6  9  1.4 
g3 2  9  7 
g4 0  5  5 
g5 7.8  5  2.8 
g6 7.8  6  1.8 
gr1 7.5  3  4.5 
gr2 8.4  7  1.4 
gr3 8  7  1 
gr4 8.3  5  3.3 
gr5 9.3  6  3.3 
gr6 9.3  5  4.3 
ir1 0  1  1 
ir2 4.9  9  4.1 
ir3 10  6  4 
ir4 6.7  6  0.7 
ir5 6.7  6  0.7 
ir6 6.7  5  1.7 
i1 10  7  3 
i2 8.3  9  0.7 i3 8  8  0 
i4 10  8  2 
i5 6.7  9  2.3 
i6 6.7  9  2.3 
nl1 7.5  9  1.5 
nl2 8.3  9  0.7 
nl3 8  10  2 
nl4 6.7  5  1.7 
nl5 8.9  7  1.9 
nl6 8.9  8  0.9 
p1 5  3  2 
p2 5.1  7  1.9 
p3 6  5  1 
p4 6.7  5  1.7 
p5 6.7  5  1.7 
p6 6.7  5  1.7 
sp1 7.5  1  6.5 
sp2 5.1  5  0.1 
sp3 0  5  5 
sp4 8.3  5  3.3 
sp5 8.9  2  6.9 
sp6 8.9  4  4.9 
s1 7.5  1  6.5 
s2 3.7  5  1.3 
s3 8  5  3 
s4 8.3  5  3.3 
s5 4.4  2  2.4 
s6 4.4  4  0.4 
uk1 0  3  3 
uk2 0.9  6  5.1 
uk3 0  6  6 
uk4 0  4  4 
uk5 0  3  3 
uk6 0  3  3 
Sources: Governmental positions (Thurner, Pappi and Stoibel 2002); Voter views (Eurobarometer 47). 
 
List of questions in Thurner, Pappi, Stoibel 2002 used to create the additive measures. 
 
Issue 1 = defense policy (question 2.5) 
Issue 2 = foreign policy (questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4) 
Issue 3 = environmental policy (question 6.3) 
Issue 4 = Employment (question 6.1) 
Issue 5 = Immigration policy (questions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5) 
Issue 6 = Asylum policy (questions 3.2, 3.3, 3.5) 
(Note – issues 5 and 6 utilize some of the same questions, as the two issues are two aspects of the same 
overall policy area (Justice and Home Affairs)).   